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“If anything, moving in the direction of more regulations isn’t consonant with the Framers’ 
intent.”i 




“[R]eligious freedom is one of the most cherished parts of our constitutional tradition…the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause [stand for] our first freedoms.”ii 
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The First Amendment to the United States Constitution constitutes a strong bulwark 
against potential tyranny.1 Under its terms, the government cannot abrogate the rights to free 
expression, to assemble, and to petition. However, freedom of religion – the “crux of the struggle 
for freedom in general” – enjoys pride of place over even these critical rights.2 Thus, religious 
liberty is the “first freedom” that Americans enjoy.3 In particular, Congress (and the states) are 
forbidden from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion – Christians and Jews, Muslims and 
Wiccans, practitioners of indigenous religions and of newly-formed faiths alike enjoy the right to 
worship in the manner in which they see fit.4 
As is the case with many constitutional provisions, successive generations of scholars 
have arrived at divergent conclusions as to the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. One faction 
of scholars believes that the Free Exercise Clause provides affirmative protection to religious 
groups – that even when a generally applicable, facially neutral law incidentally burdens a 
person or group’s religious exercise, the law is unconstitutional as applied to that person or 
group. An opposing strain of scholarship holds that the Clause provides somewhat less 
protection, merely restricting the government from directly targeting religious exercise for 
special burdens. In this view, incidental burdens caused by generally applicable laws are 
constitutionally permissible. 
At varying points in judicial history, the Supreme Court’s free exercise doctrine has been 
consonant with each side’s interpretation. With minor exceptions, the Court historically balanced 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Hobson, p. 268  
2 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
3 McConnell (B), p. 1243 
4 Free Exercise Clause, Amendment I, United States Constitution. Note also that the courts have adopted an 
expansive definition of “religion” that extends as far as secular humanism (and other traditions that lack belief in the 
existence of a higher power). See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (“Among religions in this country 
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, 
Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others…”). 
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state interests against the interests of religious individuals, subjecting laws to strict scrutiny once 
a party had shown that a statute caused a substantial burden on his or her religious exercise. 
However, in an abrupt turn in 1990, the Supreme Court repudiated that standard, holding that 
facially neutral, generally applicable laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause simply 
because they incidentally burdened religious exercise. 
In this paper, I approach the Free Exercise Clause from an interpretivist perspective, as I 
believe that the context in which the Clause was developed, as well as the intentions of those 
who drafted and ratified the Clause, are critical to understanding what the Clause should legally 
require. I begin by providing a summary of the relevant jurisprudence, and I explain the current 
and historical standards used to adjudicate free exercise claims, highlighting the Supreme 
Court’s abrupt doctrinal change. I then speak about Congress’ legislative response to the Court’s 
decision, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, whose legislative history examines events in 
revolutionary-era Virginia the circumstances surrounding the development and ratification of the 
Bill of Rights, and free exercise jurisprudence generally. 
At that point, I provide a justification for using an interpretivist methodology, following 
which I examine events in the history of religious liberty in Virginia. I begin by exploring the 
Virginia Declaration of Rights, which guaranteed religious liberty to that state’s inhabitants. I 
then use two case studies of events in Virginia to demonstrate that the popular conception of 
religious liberty and free exercise was robust. Following that, I move to the views of James 
Madison, who was deeply involved in the events in Virginia. Finally, I provide an account of the 
circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Bill of Rights, which Madison was principally 
responsible for writing. 
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Virginia is particularly informative, for as Justice Rutledge wrote, the “great instruments 
of the Virginia struggle for religious liberty … became warp and woof of our constitutional 
tradition.”5 During the Revolutionary era, the rest of the nation looked to Virginia to inform their 
conceptions of religious freedom for various reasons.6 An outsize percentage of the nation’s 
political elites – Washington, Jefferson, Madison – hailed from Virginia, and their experience 
informed the nation. Moreover, Virginia’s battle for religious liberty was the most prominent of 
the era.7 If the context in which the amendments were developed is important, the Virginia 
experience – on which the “chief interest in all the union” was centered – provides the basis for 
understanding what that context was.8 
Ultimately, I conclude that the first faction of scholars provides a more satisfying answer 
– more likely than not, the Framers intended the Free Exercise Clause to be robust. As Congress 
and the President found in 1993, “[L]aws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise 
as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.”9 It is not just the latter from 
which the Free Exercise Clause protects religious believers. It is the former as well. 
 
The Sherbert Test and Smith  
Because I extensively consider the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause, I begin this paper by explicating the two standards on which the Court has historically 
relied to decide free exercise claims (currently, the Smith standard, and prior to that, the Sherbert 
test).  
                                                 
5 Everson (Rutledge, J., dissenting) 
6 Cobb, p. 484 
7 Id., p. 484 
8 Id., p. 484; Buckley, p. ix 
9 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(2) 
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Historically, the Free Exercise Clause has not been among the most frequently litigated 
constitutional provisions. Modern free exercise jurisprudence began in 1961 with two cases.10 
The first was Torcaso v. Watkins, in which the Supreme Court, relying on both the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, held that states could not require a religious test as a prerequisite for 
holding public office.11 The second was Braunfeld v. Brown, in which the Court held that a 
statute requiring businesses to close on Sunday did not violate the free exercise rights of 
Orthodox Jews.12 It is, however, the third case – Sherbert v. Verner (1963) – that is best 
remembered as the source of the eponymous test used (until 1990) to determine whether an 
individual’s free exercise rights had been violated.13 
The Sherbert Test, a species of strict scrutiny, consists of four prongs. The test begins by 
requiring the individual to prove two things. First, he must prove that he has a sincerely held 
religious belief, and second, he must demonstrate that some governmental law or action 
constitutes a substantial burden on his ability to act on those beliefs. If the individual 
successfully demonstrates those two things to the court, the law or action is subjected to strict 
scrutiny. In order for the government to prevail, it must prove that it is acting to accomplish a 
compelling state interest, and that it is doing so in the most narrowly-tailored way possible. Thus, 
the state of South Carolina was not permitted to deny Sherbert welfare benefits for refusing to 
work on her Sabbath, as the availability of the welfare benefit could not be contingent on a 
requirement to violate one’s religious beliefs. 
                                                 
10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) is also important, as it is the case in which the Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s incorporation doctrine. 
11 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) 
12 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) 
13 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) 
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Until the Court’s holding in Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Sherbert Test was 
used to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause had been violated.14 In Smith, the Court 
adopted a far more permissive standard. If a law were facially neutral and generally applicable, it 
would no longer be held to violate free exercise rights. Thus, the state of Oregon was permitted 
to deny unemployment benefits to various Native Americans because they had ingested peyote (a 
controlled substance) during a religious ceremony – a practice that predates the arrival of 
Europeans in the New World.15 
Smith’s doctrinal change came as a complete surprise to the legal community.16 Indeed, 
counsel for both parties assumed that the Court would use the Sherbert test to decide the case, 
and neither side argued otherwise in either written or oral arguments.17 Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, asserted that the Free Exercise Clause was never intended to exempt religious 
believers from generally applicable laws.18 The majority held that the strict scrutiny mandated by 
the Sherbert test was only applicable in two types of cases: those involving claims for 
unemployment benefits (as Sherbert itself was), and those implicating both free exercise rights 
and another constitutional claim.19 Notably, the majority failed to provide an underlying 
rationale that would justify the limitation of the Sherbert test to so-called “hybrid cases.”20 
Although she concurred in the Court’s judgment, Justice O’Connor criticized the majority 
for abandoning the Sherbert test without any “convincing reason.”21 In her view, Smith 
eviscerated the Free Exercise Clause – she thought it clear that the Constitution sets religious 
conduct apart as a “preferred…activity,” and argued that the Court’s new standard subverted that 
                                                 
14 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) 
15 Laycock (B), p. 7 
16 Id., p. 2 
17 Id., p. 1 
18 Marin, p. 1456 
19 Id., pp. 1457-8 
20 Id., p. 1458 
21 Smith, p. 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
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goal.22 Moreover, she expressed concern that the Smith standard would permit majoritarian 
institutions to trample on the rights of minority religious groups, contrary to the purpose of the 
Bill of Rights.23 The dissenting justices largely agreed with O’Connor as to the shortcomings of 
the majority’s new standard, but concluded that the state’s interest was not sufficiently 
compelling to justify applying Oregon’s controlled substance statutes to the respondents.24 
The holding in Smith comprises the jurisprudential status quo. The Free Exercise Clause 
has been construed to provide no defense against the application of otherwise neutral laws, and 
therefore the state must no longer prove that its laws are able to withstand strict scrutiny. Thus, 
religious believers are far less protected under Smith than they were under Sherbert. They no 
longer have a constitutional basis to claim exemptions from burdensome laws, except in a very 
limited set of circumstances. 
Consider the following hypothetical statute: a city decides to ban the possession and 
consumption of alcohol within its borders.25 Such a law would present severe problems for 
Catholics, as the Eucharist cannot be celebrated without alcoholic wine made from grapes.26 The 
Eucharist – in which bread and wine are transubstantiated into the literal body and blood of 
Christ – is the sine qua non of the Latin Rite Mass, and Catholics are fundamentally unable to 
practice their religion without celebrating the Eucharist. 
Under the Smith rule, such a neutral and generally applicable statute would be 
permissible, barring evidence that the statute was enacted for the purpose of targeting Catholic 
                                                 
22 Id., pp. 901-2 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
23 Id., p. 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
24 Marin, pp. 1463-5 
25 Note that the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution permits states to regulate alcohol as they see fit, and 
that in many states, such authority is delegated to the county and/or local level. 
26 See the Catholic Encyclopedia’s entry for “Altar Wine” for more information as to the exact requirements that a 
wine must meet in order to be used as part of Mass. 
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religious exercise.27 By contrast, under the Sherbert test, the city would have to prove that 
applying the statute to Catholics celebrating Mass would further a compelling state interest that 
justified the effective suppression of the Catholic religion – in my opinion, an impossible burden 
to meet. 
This example, of course, is not completely far-fetched, as a similar statutory regime was 
in effect during Prohibition. Catholics, however, were unaffected, as the legislation that regulated 
alcohol during prohibition contained a particularized exemption for sacramental wine.28 This 
exemption was likely granted because Catholics form a significant percentage of the American 
population, and therefore enjoy considerable political clout. By contrast, a smaller religious 
group would likely find itself unable to obtain an analogous exemption – hence Justice 
O’Connor’s warning of the reduced protection provided by the Smith standard. This is why the 
stakes are so high for religious believers: unless one belongs to a religious with sufficient 
political power to substantively affect legislative decisions, one is essentially powerless against 
the tyranny of the majority.29 The Free Exercise Clause, understood robustly, provides the only 
constitutional guarantee of accommodation for minority religions – a guarantee that only the 
Sherbert standard preserves. 
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)30 
The Court’s abrupt change in doctrine did not go unnoticed, as the holding in Smith 
created widespread controversy and outraged members of the legal community, religious groups, 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
28 National Prohibition Act, Title II, § 3 (note that this law is commonly known as the “Volstead Act”)  
29 This is true even if such tyranny is unwitting: under Smith’s rule, exemptions must be explicitly written into 
statute. It is thus easy for legislators to unintentionally abrogate the rights of members of lesser-known religions. 
30 42 U.S. Code, Chapter 21B (42 U.S.C. §2000bb)  
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and civil liberties advocacy organizations.31 Ultimately, Congress would take action, passing the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which required the judiciary to discard the Smith standard 
and restore the Sherbert test. Though the Supreme Court would eventually rule RFRA 
unconstitutional as applied to the states, it still provides a strong statutory basis for free exercise 
claims against the federal government. Most importantly, RFRA provides Congress’ perspective 
on the history of free exercise in the United States, including Congress’ conclusion that the Free 
Exercise Clause was intended to provide religious believers with a means to gain exemptions 
from facially neutral, generally applicable laws.  
In the immediate wake of Smith, legal scholars took O’Connor’s dissent to heart, 
predicting that members of minority religions would be particularly fearful, as they indeed 
lacked sufficient political clout to demand particularized legislative exemptions to statutes 
burdening their religious exercise.32 Those predictions, however, understated the scope of the 
overwhelmingly negative public reaction. Members of mainstream religions – including the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, the episcopal conference representing the clergy 
of the single largest denomination in the United States – were extremely concerned about 
Smith.33 Moreover, a diverse cadre of nonreligious groups, such as the Home School Legal 
Defense Association, Concerned Women for America, and the American Civil Liberties Union, 
joined religious groups to oppose what they saw as an attack on civil liberties.34 
Galvanized by this political support, Congress began to craft a legislative response. In 
1990, Rep. Stephen Solarz introduced the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The bill 
specifically repudiated the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith and required the judiciary to 
                                                 
31 Laycock (B), p. 1 
32 Mykkeltvedt, p. 630  
33 Senate Hearing, p. III 
34 Id., p. III; Drinan, p. 533 
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employ the Sherbert test, which it had used prior to that decision.35 Although it initially appeared 
that the bill would easily pass – its sponsor noted that support for the bill was similar to that for 
“motherhood and apple pie”36 – it languished in committee for several years, as various 
constituents worried that the bill, as written, would provide an opportunity for pro-choice 
advocates to successfully challenge restrictions on abortion.37 
In March of 1993, then-Representative Charles Schumer introduced a revised version of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Substantially similar to the earlier proposed legislation, 
the proposed text clarified various minor points. In order to obviate the abortion-related 
concerns, Congress agreed to create legislative reports reflecting that the bill would not affect the 
issue. Rather, like every other issue, abortion-related claims would be evaluated under the pre-
Smith framework.38 Thus, although the 1993 bill differs from the original proposal, much of the 
testimony offered to Congress regarding the 1990 bill is nevertheless applicable to the later 
version. 
The religious stakeholders having been appeased, this iteration of RFRA was well-
received by Congress, as a bipartisan coalition of sixty Senators and one hundred seventy 
Representatives co-sponsored the bill.39 Congressional voting mirrored that high level of support 
– the bill was passed with only three dissenting votes in the Senate, and by a unanimous voice 
vote in the House. President Clinton was an enthusiastic supporter and quickly signed the bill, 
noting that it would protect “fundamental” civil liberties.40 
                                                 
35 Drinan, p. 533   
36 House Hearing I, p. 13 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz) 
37 Drinan, p. 534 
38 Id., p. 538 
39 See entries in THOMAS for H.R.1308 and S.578 for the 103rd Congress. 
40 Clinton, p. 2377 
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Although there had been debate as to the constitutionality of RFRA, Congress, guided by 
testimony from acknowledged legal experts,41 believed that RFRA was a constitutionally 
permissible exercise of its power under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 
In relevant part, the Amendment provides that “No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”43 Additionally, the Amendment 
affirmatively grants Congress the power to enforce its provisions.44 Thus, Congress interpreted 
RFRA as a mechanism that secured the right to free exercise – a liberty guaranteed to citizens by 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause – against the states.45 
In 1997, however, the Supreme Court overturned RFRA as applied to the states, 
reasoning that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority.46 Although the Court 
conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to promulgate legislation 
enforcing the right to free exercise, it held that RFRA was not an example of such legislation.47 
The Court believed that RFRA, rather than enforcing the constitutional right to free exercise, 
attempted to alter the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.48 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, ruled that RFRA effectively substituted Congress’ 
interpretation of the Constitution for the judiciary’s, an impermissible violation of separation of 
powers.49 RFRA, the Court held, was a Congressional attempt to “decree the substance of 
                                                 
41 E.g. House Hearing II, p. 66 (summary of statement of Douglas Laycock) 
42 House Report, p. 9 
43 Amendment XIV, United States Constitution (§ 1) 
44 Id. (§ 5) (see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 631 [1966]) 






[constitutional] restrictions on the States.”50 In the Court’s eyes, RFRA was not only 
unconstitutional, but dangerous – if Congress were permitted to decide the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (and thus the meaning of the rights-granting constitutional provisions 
thereby incorporated against the states), it would be able to subvert the Constitution, justifying 
any law as permissible by virtue of the Amendment’s grant of enforcement powers.51 
Despite the Court’s holding, the substantive portions of RFRA are still binding on the 
federal government, as Congress is broadly empowered to limit its own activities.52 Thus, 
although RFRA creates a federal statutory right, Smith is still the authoritative constitutional 
standard for interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
RFRA is particularly relevant because its legislative history reflects Congress’ explicit 
belief that the Free Exercise Clause was intended to provide exemptions from generally 
applicable laws. In its report on RFRA, the House Committee on the Judiciary spoke of generally 
applicable laws as “nefariously burden[ing]” free exercise.53 Similarly, the Senate Committee on 
the Judiciary characterized such laws as “abuses” that serve to “severely undermine[] religious 
observance.”54 Concomitant with this belief, text of RFRA notes that laws that incidentally 
burden religious exercise are as repugnant to the guarantees of the Clause as laws that 
intentionally interfere with religious exercise.55 
Additionally, the Senate committee explicitly addressed the Framers, expressing its belief 
that one of the United States’ founding principles was “the right to observe one's faith, free from 
Government interference.”56 Moreover, President Clinton concurred with Congress, stating, 
                                                 
50 Id. (at p. 9 [slip op.]) 
51 Id. (at p. 19 [slip op.]) 
52 E.g. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) 
53 House Report, p. 2 
54 Senate Report, p. 5 
55 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(2) 
56 Id., p. 4 
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“[RFRA] reestablishes a standard that better protects all Americans of all faiths in the exercise of 
their religion in a way that I am convinced is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders 
of this Nation than the Supreme Court decision [Smith].”57 
Viewed in the light of RFRA’s legislative history, the bill’s pronouncement that “the 
framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured 
its protection in the First Amendment” is no mere platitude.58 Rather, it represents the clear 
Congressional belief that facially neutral, generally applicable laws may substantially burden 
religious exercise, and are not constitutionally tolerable. This finding is consonant with the 
robust understanding of free exercise that I believe relevant events in Revolutionary-era Virginia 
demonstrate – the subject to which I will now turn. 
 
Why Original Intent and Meaning are Important 
At this point, I will discuss originalism in some depth, as I will spend the rest of this 
paper discussing 18th century events. As the divergent standards that the Supreme Court has used 
to evaluate free exercise claims demonstrate, making sense of the Constitution (or of statutes 
generally) can be a difficult task. In the vast majority of cases, statutory language is ambiguous, 
at least to some degree. Thus, courts (or legislatures) must look to many factors when deciding 
what a statute requires – and two of the most important elements that contribute to understanding 
statutes are the original meaning of the text and the intent of the original authors (and, when 
appropriate, ratifiers) of the statute.59 
As statutory interpretation can be a difficult task, the judiciary has adopted “canons of 
construction,” which provide a consistent framework – a common set of tools – that judges can 
                                                 
57 Clinton, p. 2377 
58 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(1) 
59 To clarify, I intend the term “statute” to encompass both ordinary laws and the Constitution. 
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use to make sense of laws.60 Even when the text of the statute is unambiguously clear, judges 
will not necessarily enforce the meaning of that text if it would produce an absurd result.61 For 
example, although the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not forbid citizens of a state from 
suing that state in federal court, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the amendment 
reflected a broad conception of state sovereign immunity, and therefore that the amendment 
precluded such suits.62 
One of the situations in which the judiciary will apply a different meaning than the plain 
language indicates is when it would “frustrate Congress’s clear intention.”63 Legislative intent is 
a valuable tool in the judiciary’s arsenal, as it allows judges to determine what those who passed 
the law thought the law would accomplish.64 Ascertaining legislative intent has been a core part 
of common law to such an extent that the validity of the technique enjoys wide consensus in the 
legal community.65 
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the United States, is superior to all other 
statutes. Thus, when evaluating whether a law conflicts with the Constitution, judges must 
interpret the Constitution itself.66 Therefore, the text of the Constitution (including amendments), 
the intention of the members of the Constitutional Convention (or of the drafters of an 
amendment), and the understanding of the ratifying states are important factors in determining 
the meaning of any Constitutional clause. 
Moreover, the Framers themselves believed that original intent and meaning were 
critically important. James Madison wrote that “the sense in which the Constitution was accepted 
                                                 
60 For an (incomplete) list of canons, see Llewellyn, pp. 401 ff. 
61 Id., p. 403 (canon/counterargument 12) 
62 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) 
63 Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997) 
64 CRS Report, pp. 41 ff. 
65 Rotunda, p. 507; also, Smith, p. 570 
66 Scalia, p. 854 (see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 [1803]) 
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and ratified” is the exclusive sense in which “it is the legitimate Constitution.”67 The constancy 
of original intent and meaning provides legal stability,68 without which the Constitution would 
be a mere “thing of wax” to be arbitrarily shaped by future interpreters; Jefferson was 
particularly worried about the unelected, unaccountable judiciary doing so.69 Indeed, Madison 
saw adherence to original intent and meaning as a key safeguard ensuring that the government 
would operate in accordance with the Constitution.70 
The Framers’ views on the importance of original intent and meaning are consonant with 
those of contemporaneous political and judicial elites. Indeed, the concept of originalism was so 
ubiquitous that it was unnecessary to give it a name.71 From centuries before the Revolutionary 
War, English courts had given great importance to both considerations, and American courts 
continued to do so post-Revolution.72 Indeed, theories that ignore or marginalize original intent 
and meaning began to gain credence only in the late twentieth century.73 Perhaps the best reason 
to care about original intent and meaning is that the courts have done so for centuries – and it is 
on precedent that the entire system of common law rests.74 
Thus, although the original intent of the Framers and of the ratifying states, as well as the 
meaning of the text as originally understood, are not dispositive to the exclusion of all other 
considerations, they should be given great weight when interpreting the Constitution. 
 
                                                 
67 Madison to Henry Lee, June 25, 1824 (in Papers of Madison) 
68 Id. 
69 Jefferson to Spencer Roane, September 6, 1819 (in Papers of Jefferson). There is some debate as to Jefferson’s 
stance on original intent and meaning, due to the fact that he famously advocated for a new constitutional 
convention every twenty-five years. However, I do not think that such a belief is necessarily incompatible with 
adherence to original intent and meaning: after all, as long as a constitution exists, there must be some standard by 
which we can judge it. Once a new constitution is adopted, the guiding standard will presumably be the original 
intent of the new authors, as well as the original understanding of the new text. 
70 Madison to Lee. 
71 Kay, p. 704 
72 Id., pp. 704-5 
73 Id., p. 705 
74 See, e.g., Stone, p. 6 
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Virginia’s Declaration of Rights 
Several months before the Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of 
Independence, the Fifth Virginia Convention adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights.75 The 
Declaration of Rights secured the right to freedom of religion – as well as the explicit right to 
free exercise – for Virginia’s residents. The debate surrounding the adoption of the Declaration 
of Rights highlights the tension between Madison’s expansive conception of religious liberty, 
and the narrower conception, limited to mere tolerance, held by an opposing faction. Ultimately, 
Madison’s understanding prevailed, demonstrating that Virginians tended to believe that 
religious liberty was a critical right requiring robust protection. 
The Declaration of Rights, principally drafted by George Mason, was intended to 
complement the forthcoming constitution that would be adopted by a newly independent 
Virginia.76 A precursor to the federal Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Rights enumerated 
various now-familiar rights appertaining to the inhabitants of Virginia, such as freedom from 
cruel and unusual punishment, freedom of the press, and the right to a speedy trial conducted 
with an impartial jury.77 
Freedom of religion was among these rights, and was addressed by the last section of the 
Declaration of Rights. However, a significant number of delegates to the Virginia Convention, 
led by James Madison, believed that the proposed language insufficiently protected religious 
rights.78 Thus, Madison submitted a counterproposal that included several substantial changes 
intended to secure a greater degree of religious freedom.79 
                                                 
75 Reinstein, p. 370 
76 Smith, p. 579; Buckley, p. 17 
77 Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776). 
78 Buckley, pp. 17-18 
79 Smith, pp. 580 ff. 
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Madison and his allies believed two portions of Mason’s language to be especially 
problematic. First, Mason’s draft stated that “all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the 
exercise of religion”; second, the state could abrogate religious exercise if adherents were to 
“disturb the peace, the happiness, or safety of society.”80 
In Madison’s eyes, Mason’s formulation placed religious believers at the mercy of the 
state. The use of the word “toleration” implied that freedom of religion was a construct of 
legislative grace, to be granted and retracted according to the whims of the majority.81 As he saw 
it, freedom of religion was an inalienable, natural right.82 Thus, Madison’s counterproposal 
substituted the phrase “all men are entitled to the full and free exercise” of religion.83 
As to the second concern, Madison believed that Mason’s formulation allowed the state 
to unjustly intrude upon religious exercise.84 Thus, in his counterproposal, the only situations in 
which the state might restrict religious exercise were when one religious group sought to deny 
“equal liberty” to another, or when “the existence of the State [was] manifestly endangered.”85 
These extremely limited circumstances represented the most stringent limits on state interference 
with religious matters up to that point in time.86 
After several weeks of debate, the Virginia Convention adopted the Declaration of Rights 
in its entirety; as for the religious clause, it adopted a combination of Madison and Mason’s 
proposed language.87 On both important points, however, Madison’s views prevailed. The 
                                                 
80 Id., p. 579 (quoting Mason’s original draft)  
81 Id., p. 581 
82 Id., p. 581 
83 Id., p. 580 (quoting Madison’s counterproposal) 
84 Id., pp. 580-1 
85 Id., p. 580 (quoting Madison’s counterproposal) 
86 Id., pp. 582-3 
87 Id., pp. 583-4 
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Convention rejected Mason’s “tolerance” formulation, adopting the position that “all men are 
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion.”88 
Moreover, the Declaration of Rights, as promulgated, specified no circumstances under 
which religious exercise might be abrogated, likely because the Convention wished to avoid the 
issue.89 However, in rejecting Mason’s language, the Convention at least indicated its belief that 
such a low bar for state interference was impermissible. At any rate, the Convention’s decision 
represented movement towards Madison’s expansive definition of religious liberty, and 
recognition that religious liberty was a right rather than a privilege.90 
The Declaration’s adoption demonstrates that the Madisonian conception of religious 
liberty was gaining traction among the people of Virginia (or at least among the state’s political 
elites). Mere tolerance was no longer sufficient: the state was required to recognize that free 
exercise was a right belonging to each individual, not to be trifled with lightly. 
 
Religious Liberty in Virginia (Introduction) 
In the decade following the Revolution, the Virginia Legislature, no longer bound by the 
British Parliament, enacted many new laws and changed many existing ones. Laws pertinent to 
the relationship between civil society and religious believers were no exception. Indeed, the 
House of Burgesses addressed the issue often enough that it had a standing Committee for 
Religion.91 The Committee had jurisdiction over a wide range of matters – the financial affairs, 
properties, and lands of the established church; all proposed laws affecting religion generally; 
and “all matters and things relating to…morality” – and had the power to receive and consider 
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petitions from concerned citizens, as well as to request information and evidence to inform their 
deliberations.92 
Two episodes are particularly informative of the contemporary attitude towards religious 
liberty in the state. First, immediately after the beginning of the Revolution, the Legislature 
passed an act requiring that all citizens swear a loyalty oath and serve in the militia. This was 
problematic for members of two minority religions, who petitioned the legislature for an 
exemption from the law. Second, almost a decade later, the Legislature considered authorizing a 
general assessment to support Christianity within the state, which triggered a year-long, 
statewide debate about the proposed law. In both cases, the party that desired a stronger 
conception of religious liberty prevailed. 
 
I: Quakers and Menonists: Exemptions from Laws 
As with the rest of the states, Revolutionary-era Virginia was largely inhabited by 
Christians. However, there were at least two significant religious minorities, Quakers and 
Menonists (commonly known today as Mennonites). Although these groups were generally able 
to practice their religion according to the dictates of their consciences, there were two notable 
areas in which their beliefs caused them legal disabilities: loyalty oaths (also referred to as 
“juring”) and military service. 
By an act of the General Assembly in force in 1777, the state of Virginia required all free 
males sixteen years of age (or older) residing within the state to swear or affirm a loyalty oath to 
the state; the substance of the oath is that the oath-taker confirmed the renunciation of all 
allegiance to the British Crown, while confirming his allegiance to the “free and independent 
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state” of Virginia.93 Although such a requirement would seem bizarre today, the General 
Assembly’s justification for mandating the oath is easy to understand, particularly given that the 
statute was enacted in the midst of the Revolutionary War. Protection was contingent on 
allegiance.94 
The penalties for failing to swear the oath were severe. The state stripped those who 
refused to comply of several of their civil rights and liberties. Non-swearers were stripped of 
arms and ammunition – a precarious situation in which to be during the 18th century (and during 
the ongoing war in particular) – forbidden to hold public office, disqualified from voting, and 
banned from serving on juries.95 Moreover, they were forbidden from purchasing or inheriting 
real property, including any attendant improvements.96 
This presented severe problems for the Quakers, as their religious beliefs forbid adherents 
from swearing oaths.97 Their belief rests on one of Jesus’ commands, delivered during the 
Sermon on the Mount: “But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is 
more than these cometh of evil.”98 Thus, Quakers believe that when one says something, one 
should do it (and vice-versa). Adding an oath “cometh of evil” (that is, of the Devil) and is 
therefore proscribed.99 Menonists share this belief with Quakers, and were therefore analogously 
affected.100 
By 1783, however, the legislature had recognized that the requirement was unjust as 
applied to the Quakers and Menonists, and it therefore promulgated a statute exempting both 
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groups from having to swear the oath.101 Notably, the legislature explicitly recognized that the 
groups’ objections were a direct result of sincerely held religious beliefs, and characterized the 
penalties that the groups were forced to suffer as “oppressive.”102 Moreover, the legislature 
retroactively sanctioned the groups’ noncompliance by explicitly deeming valid any purchases of 
real property by Quakers or Menonists between the enactment and repeal of the oath 
requirement.103 
Non-juring was not the only area in which the Quakers received a particularized 
exemption from otherwise generally applicable laws. As their beliefs precluded them from 
bearing arms, they also received an exemption from participating in the monthly musters held by 
the militia, at which attendance was mandated by law. 
The Quakers first requested the exemption in June of 1784, when the House of Delegates 
received a petition from Quakers living in Frederick County stating that refusing to bear arms 
was a “fundamental principle[] of their religion” and requesting to be exempted from the 
monthly muster, their compelled attendance at which they characterized as a “very great 
grievance.”104 The House referred the petition to the Committee on Propositions and Grievances, 
which deemed it reasonable after only four days of consideration.105 
Less than one week later, a bill aptly titled “An act to exempt Quakers from attending 
musters” passed the House, already having been read three times. Two days after it passed the 
House, the Virginia Senate agreed to the bill. Thus, in less than a month after submitting a 
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petition – and with apparently no immediate opposition – the Quakers received their requested 
exemption. 
Although the petition exclusively came from the Quakers, and the bill referred to Quakers 
alone, there is reason to believe that the bill also applied to Menonists, whose religious dictates 
also forbade them from bearing arms.106 Secondary literature from the late 19th century indicates 
that a 1785 petition submitted by the Baptists complaining of the exemptions granted to the 
Quakers and Menonists – the only petition during that timeframe opposing the exemptions – 
referred directly to the exemption from participation at musters.107 Thus, it appears that although 
the law did not explicitly mention Menonists, the group nevertheless received the same 
exemption granted to the Quakers. 
This case study demonstrates the willingness of the Virginia Legislature, having enacted 
a facially neutral, generally applicable bill, to readily provide exemptions to such statutes when 
appropriate.108 Each of these requirements was significant, as both loyalty oaths and the 
mustering requirement were thought necessary for wartime readiness and success.109 Two 
specific items are particularly worthy of note: the lack of anything more than token, belated 
opposition to either request, and the legislature’s willingness to recognize the degree to which 
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II: The “Christian Teachers Bill” 
Like many states in the Revolutionary era, Virginia had an established church, choosing 
to designate the Episcopal Church as such. The Episcopal Church, like its counterparts in other 
states, had received financial support throughout the colonial era by means of legally mandated 
tithing. However, in 1776, after Virginia adopted its state Bill of Rights, it abolished the 
practice.110 
Predictably, the (established) Episcopal Church was displeased. In a 1784 appeal to the 
legislature, the church noted its desire that the government generally “aid and patronize” the 
Christian religion, a desire that some others shared.111 For example, earlier in the same year, the 
citizens of the county of Warwick, concerned about what they characterized as a contemporary 
dearth of morality, petitioned the legislature to enact a general tax on the citizenry to support 
Christianity.112 The House’s Committee on Religion, which had jurisdiction over the petition, 
thought the petition reasonable.113 
Later that year, the legislature received another petition on the same subject, this time 
from various residents of the county of the Isle of Wight. The petitioners were upset that civil 
government had withdrawn itself from affairs of religion, and that people were “left without the 
smallest coercion to contribute to its support.”114 Because they believed that the very “prosperity 
and happiness” of the state depended on religion, they also argued for a general assessment to 
support it.115 
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In November, the House of Delegates, meeting as the Committee of the Whole, resolved 
by a vote of 47-32 that it was their opinion that the people of Virginia ought to pay a tax for the 
support of the Christian religion.116 The community was swift to react, as only one week later, 
the legislature received its first petition disapproving of the idea.117 A second petition, received 
shortly afterwards, decried the idea; both petitions were referred to the Committee of the 
Whole.118 Despite their earlier victory in the Committee of the Whole, the supporters of the 
general assessment were never able to secure its passage.119 
By December, references to the general assessment per se disappeared. Hoping to 
encourage wider support by framing the issue as one of education rather than of worship, the 
drafting committee revised the bill’s title.120 Staunchly supported by Patrick Henry, the revised 
bill would levy a general assessment not for the support of the Christian religion generally, but 
for “teachers of the Christian religion.”121 The House spent several days debating the bill, and its 
first two readings were successful. However, before the third reading could take place, the House 
resolved – on Christmas Eve, no less – by a vote of 45-38 to table the bill until the fourth 
Thursday of November 1785.122 
In the interim, delegates (and state senators) were to return to their home districts, each 
with twelve printed copies of the bill, to include the names of those legislators who voted in the 
affirmative and the negative.123 During 1785, each side campaigned fiercely in favor of its 
position. Notably, James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, 
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which castigated the bill both as poor public policy and as contrary to the interests of religion, 
was written and delivered during that time. 
The response to the bill, delivered through petitions, was overwhelming both in its size 
and in its relative agreement.124 During 1785, at least sixty-nine petitions were presented to the 
House, sixty of which were against the bill and nine of which supported it.125 In percentage 
terms, eighty-seven percent of petitions opposed the bill, compared to a mere thirteen percent in 
favor. Further, a large portion of the reasons that petitioners gave for opposing Henry’s bill 
reflected broad community ideas of religious freedom. Included among these reasons was that 
the bill was repugnant to the Virginia Bill of Rights (which guaranteed free exercise at the state 
level),126 that it was inconsistent with an established community understanding of religious 
freedom,127 and that it violated the principle of equal religious liberty.128 Other petitions simply 
characterized the proposed law as an example of oppression and injustice129 or incompatible with 
community interests,130 while some opposed the law because they believed that it would harm, 
rather than help, religion.131 Those supporting the bill generally believed that it was the state’s 
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role to promote religion,132 as a successful republic required morality, which only religion could 
provide.133 
In keeping with the public opinion expressed in the petitions, the House never chose to 
take the bill off the table, resulting in its defeat. However, this was not the end of the battle. 
Madison, not content with merely defeating the general assessment, turned his energies towards 
the proposed Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, written by Thomas Jefferson.134 
This bill accomplished precisely the opposite of Henry’s, ensuring that no one could be 
compelled to attend or support any religious activities.135 Moreover, the bill reinforced the 
Virginia Bill of Rights’ free exercise provision, clarifying that it was impermissible to deprive 
anyone of civil rights due to their religious convictions.136 
In late 1785, the opponents of Jefferson’s bill attempted to employ the same 
parliamentary tactic that prevented Henry’s bill from achieving passage in 1784: tabling the third 
reading until late the next year. However, they were soundly defeated, as the House of Delegates 
passed the bill on a lopsided vote of 74-20.137 In early January of 1786, the Senate and the House 
concurred on a jointly-amended version, and the bill was then promulgated.138 
This case study serves as a further demonstration of the contemporary attitude towards 
religious liberties in Virginia. Having begun with an original proposal to tax each inhabitant for 
the support of Christianity, the idea’s proponents scaled down their bill such that a tax would 
support the ministers of various denominations. However, after a yearlong campaign, public 
opinion established itself as decisively against the proposal. 
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Critically, public opinion was not merely based on a lack of desire to be taxed, as the 
petitions submitted against the proposal tend to cite qualms based on religious and libertarian 
concerns. Indeed, the proposed assessment triggered widespread dismay, galvanizing the pro-
religious liberty movement. Thus, the legislature did not merely reject the proposed tax. Rather, 
it enacted a bill that explicitly disavowed the idea, as well as provided comprehensive 
protections to all religious groups. The Christian Teachers’ bill was a massive loss for 
proponents of a narrow conception of religious liberty, as it stands for a statewide embrace of 
Madison’s robust vision of religious freedom. 
 
Religious Liberty in Virginia (Conclusion) 
The previous two case studies illuminate the Revolutionary-era attitudes towards 
religious liberty in Virginia. While the first explicitly demonstrates the state’s willingness to 
grant exemptions to neutral laws to burdened religious believers, the second is indicative of the 
general attitude towards religious liberty in the state. Facing the specter of a potential tax for the 
support of Christianity, the citizenry registered their disapproval – not of the tax per se, but of 
the principles supported by the tax’s proponents. Thus, the legislature responded by not only 
killing the tax, but also passing an expansive guarantee of religious liberties, in line with what 
public opinion demanded. 
 
Madison’s Personal Beliefs 
James Madison provides the vital link between the fight for religious freedom in Virginia 
and the Free Exercise Clause, as he was a leader of the former and the principal author of the 
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latter. 139 As the father of religious liberty in Virginia and the “Father of the Constitution,” 
Madison provides perhaps the most revealing account of the Framers’ interpretation of the First 
Amendment.140  His views are critically important to understanding the meaning of the Clause – 
and his views are unambiguous. Madison was a consistent advocate for civil liberties generally, 
as well as an outspoken advocate of a robust conception of religious freedom.141 
Cited as the document with the greatest explanatory power with respect to the Founding 
Fathers’ views on religious liberty, Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious 
Assessments discusses the relationship between civil government and religious exercise at 
length.142 Written as part of the campaign against the proposed Virginia general assessment, the 
Remonstrance denounces the bill as an “experiment on our liberties” and a violation of the free 
exercise rights protected by the Virginia Bill of Rights.143 
The heart of Madison’s opposition was rooted in the idea that government has no power 
to interfere in religious matters: 
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it 
is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an 
unalienable right…because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is 
the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be 
acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the 
claims of Civil Society…[and] Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.144 
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Madison’s statement leaves absolutely no room for ambiguity – civil society is completely 
forbidden from interfering with religious exercise. Because men’s (and women’s) obligations to 
God take precedence over their obligations towards society, it would be impermissible for 
society to restrict the ability of its members to worship in the manner that they believe is divinely 
ordained. Still less can the legislature – a derivative of society – restrict religious exercise, as any 
legislature that would attempt to do so would be guilty of tyranny and thus illegitimate.145 
 
Ambiguity in the First Congress 
As the Constitution in its original form did not address religious liberty, the First 
Congress addressed the issue in the broader context of debating a proposed Bill of Rights, 
principally written by Madison.146 However, the Congressional Record, as well as records of 
state ratification proceedings on the topic of the religious clauses of the First Amendment, is 
sparse, as other issues dominated the discussion. Ultimately, the record is ambiguous, and the 
originalist must rely on alternate sources in order to gain historical perspective. 
Although the members of the Constitutional Convention debated including a Bill of 
Rights, they ultimately decided against doing so. However, this decision was not universally 
well-received, as many of the state delegates objecting to ratification did so because of the lack 
of explicit constitutional guarantees of basic rights.147 Although Madison was originally against 
inclusion, he eventually concluded – likely persuaded by Jefferson – that a Bill of Rights was 
necessary, and he promised the Virginia ratifying Convention that he would introduce a set of 
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proposed amendments to that effect in the First Congress.148 He followed through, and beginning 
in August of 1789, the House considered his proposal.149 
Regrettably, the record of Congressional proceedings with respect to the Free Exercise 
Clause (as well as the Establishment Clause) is sparse.150 However, the evolution of the language 
was recorded. Madison’s first proposal closely mirrored the Virginia Act for Establishing 
Religious Freedom, but the responsible committee shortened it; the relevant part read, “the equal 
rights of conscience [shall not] be infringed.”151 After debate, the House chose to adopt the 
following formulation, proposed by Representative Ames: “Congress shall make no law…to 
prevent the free exercise [of religion], or to infringe the rights of conscience.”152 Unfortunately, 
the House never commented on Ames’ language; rather, it was approved without further 
debate.153 
The Senate, however, chose not to reference the “rights of conscience,” only providing 
that Congress was forbidden to restrict the “free exercise of religion.”154 Unfortunately, the 
Senate’s debates and votes on the issue were never recorded.155 Ultimately, the joint conference 
committee agreed on language closer to the Senate’s version: the now familiar command that 
“Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.156 
From this morass, however, there is one thing that is likely true. The language eventually 
adopted probably reflected Madison’s understanding of free exercise. Although Ames’ language 
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was not debated, it is almost certain that his proposal was actually Madison’s.157 Moreover, 
Madison was a member of the joint conference committee that proposed the final language, 
which reflected Ames’ proposal.158 However, it is impossible to prove this with complete 
certainty, especially as the committee likely desired to leave some degree of ambiguity in the 
proposal as a matter of political expediency.159 
The state ratification process sheds little additional light on the understanding of the 
religion clauses. Federalists tended to believe that the Constitution already protected religious 
liberty,160 and Antifederalists did not substantively disagree, as they were more concerned with 
other potential threats to civil liberties.161 Other parts of the Bill of Rights overshadowed the 
religious clauses, leading to little debate about religious freedom. 
The original intent of both the ratifying states and the First Congress with respect to the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment is therefore unclear, as substantial ambiguity and a lack 
of debate make that intent difficult to discern. Thus, there are only two sources to which we can 
turn in order to reliably inform an originalist perspective. First, the intent of the primary author, 
James Madison, provides insight as to the intended meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Second, the broad conception of religious liberty that existed in the Revolutionary era, informed 





                                                 
157 Brant, p. 271 
158 Smith, p. 616 
159 Id., p. 616 
160 E.g. Kurland, p. 847 (quoting James Iredell at the North Carolina Constitutional ratifying convention)  
161 Id., p. 851 
Toth 34 
Conclusion 
In 1993, Congress – with only three dissenting voices – found that the Framers intended 
the Free Exercise Clause to protect against incidental burdens on religion caused by facially 
neutral, generally applicable laws. The Virginia experience and the views of Madison, informed 
by the previous century of colonial history, tend to confirm that view. 
Indeed, that is why the decision in Smith – in which Justice Scalia termed allowing 
exemptions to generally applicable laws a “luxury” – was so shocking to both the legal 
community and to the public.162 The compelling interest test was the well-established standard 
used in free exercise cases (so much so that both parties in Smith assumed that it would be used), 
and the Supreme Court overturned it without even entertaining briefs or arguments on the issue, 
outraging many members of the legal community.163 Even Free Exercise revisionists criticize the 
Smith decision, arguing that even though its central holding is sound, the decision itself is poorly 
reasoned, unpersuasive, an unjustified rejection of precedent, and an example of judicial 
overreach.164 
In some senses, the doctrinal shift was not quite as abrupt as it seems. Marin, for 
example, argues that Smith is the culmination of a period of time during which the Court became 
reluctant to grant exemptions to religious believers, yet was unwilling to abandon the Sherbert 
test.165 Only two of the Justices on the bench at the time of the Sherbert decision – Brennan and 
White – were also serving when Smith was decided, and it may be that the shift in doctrine was 
simply a consequence of the Court’s changed membership.166 
                                                 
162 Smith 
163 Laycock (B), p. 1 
164 See, e.g., Marshall, pp. 308-9 
165 The Court accomplished this by consistently holding that the state had met its burden under the Sherbert test. See 
Marin, pp. 1445 ff.  
166 Both White and Brennan decided the two cases consistently: White voted against the religious believers, and 
Brennan voted for them. 
Toth 35 
Ultimately, the Court’s conclusion is utterly inconsistent with its previous jurisprudence. 
Consider Justice Scalia – the same Justice who in 1990 wrote: 
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.167 
 
one year earlier wrote: 
 
In such cases as Sherbert  v. Verner,  Wisconsin  v. Yoder,  Thomas  v. Review Bd. of Indiana  
Employment  Security  Div., and Hobbie  v. Unemployment  Appeals  Comm'n  of Fla., we held 
that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment  required  religious  beliefs  to be 
accommodated  by granting  religion-specific  exemptions  from  otherwise applicable law.168 
 
Of those two statements, only one can be correct. If history is any guide, the latter statement is 
closer to correct than the former.169 
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